

Powershell'in Karanlık Yüzü

Sistemlere Sızma, Bırakılan İzler, Phant0m



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>_ Powershell

- Microsoft tarafından Windows komut satırı cmd.exe ve Windows Script Host'a alternatif olarak geliştirilen yeni nesil bir komut satırı uygulamasıdır.

>_ Powershell

TeslaPSModule

Control your Tesla vehicle from PowerShell. Watch the demo at <https://channel9.msdn.com/Events/PowerShell-Team/PowerShell-10-Year-Anniversary/PowerShell-For-My-Tesla>!

Tesla PowerShell Module

This module will enable you to call Tesla commands (like those from <http://mytesla.com> and your phone app) in a PowerShell script, and automate them in Scheduled Tasks etc. just like Windows services.

- Start your climate control automatically
- Log your physical location over time
- Use your imagination!

>_ Karanlık Taraf

Talos team spotted a PowerShell malware that uses DNS queries to contact the C2

March 3, 2017 By [Pierluigi Paganini](#)

December 12, 2016 by [LIFARS](#)

Microsoft's PowerShell is Being Abused by Malware Authors

Microsoft Powershell, the software giant's prominent scripting language that is now the default shell in the ever-popular Windows operating system is being used by cybercriminals to spread malware, security researchers have revealed.

The Dark Power of Windows PowerShell

By: [Roberto Sponchioni](#)  SYMANTEC EMPLOYEE

Created 07 Apr 2014 |  0 Comments |  : 日本語

Windows PowerShell, the Microsoft scripting language, has made the headlines recently due to malware authors leveraging it for malicious purposes. Symantec has identified more [PowerShell scripts](#) being used

PowerShell threats surge: 95.4 percent of analyzed scripts were malicious

Symantec analyzed 111 threat families that use PowerShell, finding that they leverage the framework to download payloads and traverse through networks.

By: [Candid Wueest](#)  SYMANTEC EMPLOYEE ACCREDITED

Created 08 Dec 2016 |  0 Comments |  : 简体中文, 日本語

>_ Neden

- Signed, Legal
- Varsayılan Olarak Yüklü
- Şifreli Trafik İle Uzaktan Erişim İmkanı
- Anti-Forensic Friendly
- Anti-Application Whitelisting Friendly
- Script-Based Malware Bağılıklığı
- Obfuscation Kolaylığı




>_ Execution Policy



- Restricted
- RemoteSigned
- AllSigned
- Unrestricted
- Bypass

>_ Projeler

- Powershell Empire
- PowerSploit
- Nishang
- PowerOPS
- p0wnedShell
- Inveigh
- Unicorn



>_ Powershell > Powershell.exe



>_ Bırakılan İzler

- Kayıt Defteri
- Ağ Trafiği
- Memory
- Prefecth
- Event Log



>_ Kayıt Defteri

- Kalıcı Olmak (Persistent)



>_ Ağ Trafiği

- WinRM, Windows Remote Management
- Powershell Remoting
- HTTP 5985, HTTPS 5986



>_ Memory

- Powershell Remoting?
- svchost.exe - DCOM Server Process
- DCOMLaunch
- C:\Windows\System32\wsmpro vhost.exe



>_Prefecth

- C:\Windows\Prefetch
- *.pf



>_ Windows Event Log

- Powershell 3.0 +
- Windows PowerShell.evtx
- Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx
- Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Analytic.etl
- Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Operational.evtx
- Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Analytic.etl



>_ Phant0m

- İz bırakmamak!?
- Windows Event Log



>_ svchost.exe

svchost.exe

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

svchost.exe (**Service Host**, or **SvcHost**) is a system [process](#) that hosts multiple [Windows services](#) in the [Windows NT](#) family of [operating systems](#).^[1] Svchost is essential in the implementation of so-called *shared service processes*, where a number of services can share a process in order to reduce resource consumption. Grouping multiple services into a single process conserves computing resources, and this consideration was of particular concern to NT designers because creating

> Windows Event Log

Process Hacker [DZLAB\PoC]+ (Administrator)

Hacker View Tools Users Help

Refresh Options Find handles or DLLs System information Search Processes (Ctrl+K)

Processes Services Network Disk

| Name | PID | CPU | I/O tot... | Private ... | User name |
|-------------------------|------|------|------------|------------------------------|--|
| SearchIndexer.exe | 3140 | | 14,34 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| SearchUI.exe | 3440 | | 34,64 MB | DZLAB\PoC | |
| services.exe | 732 | 0,03 | 2,6 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| ShellExperienceHost.exe | 3332 | | 15,91 MB | DZLAB\PoC | |
| sihost.exe | 3052 | | 3,38 MB | DZLAB\PoC | |
| smss.exe | 484 | | 336 kB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| spoolsv.exe | 1444 | | 8,03 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| svchost.exe | 560 | | 6,09 MB | NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE | |
| svchost.exe | 580 | | 4,73 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| svchost.exe | 804 | 0,01 | 4,42 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| svchost.exe | 836 | | 2,97 MB | NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE | |
| svchost.exe | 1004 | | 14,8 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| svchost.exe | 1048 | 0,03 | 2,73 MB | NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE | |
| svchost.exe | 1076 | | 13,71 MB | NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE | |
| svchost.exe | 1200 | | 4,07 MB | NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE | |
| svchost.exe | | | | | C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted |
| svchost.exe | | | | | File: |
| svchost.exe | | | | | C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe |
| svchost.exe | | | | | Host Process for Windows Services 10.0.10240.16384 |
| svchost.exe | | | | | Microsoft Corporation |
| svchost.exe | | | | | Service group name: |
| svchost.exe | | | | | LocalServiceNetworkRestricted |
| System | | | | | Services: |
| System Idle Process | | | | | Audiosrv (Windows Audio) |
| taskhostw.exe | | | | | Dhcp (DHCP Client) |
| | | | | | EventLog (Windows Event Log) |
| | | | | | NgcCtnrSvc (Microsoft Passport Container) |
| | | | | | Wcmsvc (Windows Connection Manager) |
| vm vmtoolsd.exe | | | | | wscsvc (Security Center) |
| vm vmtoolsd.exe | | | | | Notes: |
| | | | | | Signer: Microsoft Windows Publisher |
| wininit.exe | 650 | | 812 kB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| winlogon.exe | 664 | | 1,76 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| WmiPrvSE.exe | 2372 | | 4,78 MB | NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE | |
| WmiPrvSE.exe | 2792 | | 19,63 MB | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM | |
| WUDFHost.exe | 820 | 0,05 | 1,63 MB | NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE | |

svchost.exe (1076) Properties

Services GPU Disk and Network Comment

General Statistics Performance Threads Token Modules Memory Environment Handles

| TID | CPU | Cycles delta | Start address | Priority | Service |
|------|---------|--------------|-------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| 1080 | | | svchost.exe +0x3440 | Normal | |
| 1356 | | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 1396 | | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 2276 | | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 2348 | 159.331 | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 2788 | | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 3912 | | | ntdll.dll!EtwEventRegister +0x50 | Normal | |
| 1392 | | | audiosrv.dll +0x40000 | Normal | Audiosrv |
| 3256 | | | combase.dll!CoFreeUnusedLibra... | Normal | Audiosrv |
| 1216 | | | sechost.dll!RegisterServiceCtrlH... | Normal | Dhcp |
| 1272 | | | dhcpcore6.dll!Dhcpv6Main | Normal | Dhcp |
| 1176 | | | wevtsvc.dll +0x42bf0 | Normal | EventLog |
| 1196 | | | wevtsvc.dll!ServiceMain +0x66e0 | Normal | EventLog |
| 1200 | | | wevtsvc.dll!ServiceMain +0x66e0 | Normal | EventLog |
| 1208 | | | wevtsvc.dll!ServiceMain +0x66e0 | Normal | EventLog |
| 1400 | | | cmintegrator.dll +0x1130 | Normal | Wcmsvc |
| 1404 | | | wcmsvc.dll!WcmSvcMain +0x10260 | Normal | Wcmsvc |
| 724 | | | wscsvc.dll!ServiceMain +0x2410 | Normal | wscsvc |
| 2716 | | | wscsvc.dll!ServiceMain +0x1580 | Normal | wscsvc |

Start module:

Started: N/A State: N/A Priority: N/A


Kernel time: N/A Base priority: N/A

User time: N/A I/O priority: N/A

Context switches: N/A Page priority: N/A

Cycles: N/A Ideal processor: N/A

Close



>_ Demo

1. .DOC (Macro)
2. MS16-032 LPE
3. Phant0m
4. Meterpreter

